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The Structure of Classical Public Law 
Barry Cushman†  
The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 
Duncan Kennedy. Beard, 2006. Pp vii, 273. 
INTRODUCTION 
The “most widely circulated and cited unpublished manuscript in 
twentieth-century American legal scholarship”
1
 since Henry M. Hart, Jr. 
and Albert M. Sacks’s legal process materials has at long last been 
formally published.
 
The original manuscript is here accompanied by a 
lengthy and disarming preface entitled “Thirty Years Later,” which 
provides interesting insights into Duncan Kennedy’s early intellectual 
influences and scholarly ambitions, and situates the project in the legal 
literature and academic politics of the 1970s. In the preface Kennedy 
explains that the manuscript was “the first draft of the first half of a 
book about the history of American legal thought from the early nine-
teenth century to World War II” (p vii). The second half of the intended 
project, which was to be about the “fall” of Classical legal thought, he 
abandoned in 1979. What is published here as The Rise and Fall of 
Classical Legal Thought is in fact almost exclusively about its “rise.” 
The book consists of five chapters. The first two consider the struc-
ture and development of classical public law.
2
 The third and fourth ex-
amine the structure and development of classical private law, employ-
ing a method that will be familiar to readers of Kennedy’s early ar-
                                                                                                                           
 † James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of History, and F.D.G. Ribble Re-
search Professor, University of Virginia. Thanks to Patty Cushman, Neil Duxbury, Fred Konefsky, 
Caleb Nelson, J. Henry Schlegel, and G. Edward White for helpful comments and conversation.  
 1 G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 Va L Rev 485, 
583 n 278 (2002) (arguing that the most important critical scholarship was historical in nature). 
 2 The first chapter was published as Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of 
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 Rsrch in L & 
Sociology 3 (1980). 
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ticles, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries
3
 and Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication.
4
 The final chapter gestures toward 
an account of the integration of classical public and private law. In this 
Review, my focus is on the chapters on public law.
5
 
Kennedy’s writing, though often abstract, is lucid and relatively 
unencumbered by jargon.
6
 There is the occasional factual error,
7
 and 
important nuances of doctrine are sometimes obscured.
8
 The research 
into the history of constitutional law is impressionistic. Nevertheless, 
Kennedy succeeds in identifying and elaborating two ideas that prove 
quite useful to understanding the constitutional law of the classical 
period. The first is the concept of legal consciousness;
9
 the second con-
cerns the structural analysis of constitutional doctrine.
10
 I consider 
each of them in turn. 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buff L Rev 205, 209–21 
(1979) (applying “to legal thought techniques developed over two centuries in what is sometimes 
called the ‘continental’ tradition of philosophy, social theory, history, psychology, and anthropology”).  
 4 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance of Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 
1725–37 (1976) (discussing three historical phases of the conflict between “altruism” and “indivi-
dualism,” constructs that “break down the sense that legal argument is autonomous from moral, 
economic, and political discourse”). 
 5 At the conclusion of the preface, Kennedy lists a series of articles written in the late 
1970s and early 1980s by colleagues and former students that, as he puts it, “extend[ed]” or “ela-
borate[d]” The Rise and Fall (pp xli–xliii). Nearly all of the cited pieces are concerned principally 
with doctrinal subjects outside of constitutional law. This is perhaps a reflection of the areas of 
study that most attracted the attention of legal historians at the time. Much of this Review is 
devoted to showing what studies applying the structuralist method advocated in The Rise and 
Fall to the domain of constitutional history might look like and reveal. 
 6 See, however, the references to “unlimited, absolute absoluteness” (pp 34, 36) and to 
“interlocked, everchanging absolutenesses” (p 156). 
 7 For example, he incorrectly reports that Texas v White, 74 US (7 Wall) 700 (1869), was 
decided in 1866 (p 35); he also incorrectly reports that Home Building & Loan Association v 
Blaisdell, 290 US 398 (1934), was decided in 1933, and that it concerned a statute enacted by the 
legislature of Wisconsin rather than that of Minnesota (p 261). 
 8 See notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
 9 Though Kennedy appeared to abandon the idea of legal consciousness immediately 
following the sentence in which he famously renounced the fundamental contradiction, see Peter 
Gabel and Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan L Rev 1, 15–16 (1984), his preface 
suggests that he has not lost all use for the concept (pp iv–xvii).  
 10 Whether Kennedy ever abandoned structuralism is the subject of controversy. Compare 
William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Me-
thodologies of Intellectual History, 49 Stan L Rev 1065, 1075 n 66 (1997) (“Kennedy is adamant 
[ ] that renunciation of the fundamental contradiction did not entail abandonment of the larger 
structuralist method. . . . ‘I remain,’ he insisted in a conversation with the author, ‘a Structuralist 
to my toes.’”), with Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal 
History, 102 Yale L J 1019, 1032 (1993) (“By 1983, Kennedy decided that structuralism had lost 
the destabilizing value it once possessed, and dropped it for a post-modern stance.”).  
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I. 
Kennedy takes as his subject “the development and disintegration 
of a form of American legal thought that emerged between 1850 
and . . . 1940,” a “way of thinking” that he calls “Classical legal thought” 
(p 1). He sets out to displace the view that “the ‘real’ alliance influen-
cing legal outcomes between 1865 and 1940 was that of the older conser-
vatism of the profession with a class of despoiling entrepreneurs and poli-
ticians against the working class, the farmers, and the ‘public interest,’” 
which was “an article of faith in the liberal historiography of the period” 
(pp 1–2). He urges the reader to abandon “the preoccupation with vali-
dating this vision of the recent past” and instead to “recognize and con-
front the existence of legal consciousness as an entity with a measure of 
autonomy” (p 2). Legal consciousness, “the body of ideas through which 
lawyers experience legal issues” (p 3), “is a set of concepts that evolves 
according to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence on results 
distinguishable from those of political power and economic interest” (p 
2).
11
 He insists that this autonomy was “no more than relative” and that 
his “approach denies the importance neither of ideologies like laissez-
faire, nor of concrete economic interests, nor of the underlying structure 
of political power. It insists only that legal consciousness, which has its 
own structure, mediates their influence on particular legal results” 
(p 2).
12
 His objective is to replace “the simpler vision of an unmediated 
interplay of purposes and outcomes” (p 2) with an “intellectual histo-
ry” (p 4) “of the transformation of legal consciousness” (p 3). Through 
the exploration of the structure of legal consciousness as it exhibits 
itself at different times, Kennedy believes that “we can arrive at a his-
tory of the experience of judicial boundness” (p 21). 
Kennedy’s principal illustrations of the capacity of legal con-
sciousness to produce “judicial boundness” are Lochner v New York
13
 
and In re Debs.
14
 He points out that both Justice Rufus Peckham’s 
opinion for the Lochner majority and Justice John Harlan’s dissenting 
opinion operated within the same analytic framework, differing only 
in the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof (pp 12–13). Simi-
larly, he observes that Justice David Brewer’s “creative” opinion in In 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Kennedy explains: 
My premise is that although Classical legal thought is unintelligible except in relation to 
thought as a whole, it was nonetheless an entity. It was not a mere reflection upon law of ex-
tra-legal ideas. It had elements of internal coherence and a logic of its own that made it par-
tially autonomous (p 253). 
 12 “The introduction of a third tier between interest or power and outcomes,” as Kennedy 
points out, “greatly complicates the task of historical exposition” (p 2). 
 13 198 US 45 (1905). 
 14 158 US 564 (1895). 
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re Debs, authorizing a federal court to enjoin a railway strike, relied 
upon analogies to dormant Commerce Clause and public nuisance 
jurisprudence that all of his colleagues found persuasive (p 17). Yet 
the skeptic might justly question how much mediating work the “legal 
consciousness” of the justices was actually doing in each of these in-
stances. In Lochner, the analytic framework was sufficiently supple to 
allow justices to work within it and yet to reach diametrically opposed 
conclusions concerning the constitutionality of the challenged statute. 
Similarly, the opinion in In re Debs was unanimous and—insofar as 
Kennedy’s account reveals—no justice preferred to reach a contrary 
result but was persuaded by the power of Justice Brewer’s analogical 
reasoning that no dissenting opinion could be professionally respecta-
ble. Lochner and In re Debs are, to be sure, examples of legal con-
sciousness shaping the ways in which the justices reasoned to their 
respective conclusions. But they do not appear to be instances in which 
that consciousness ultimately constrained the justices concerning the 
results to which they might reason. An even stronger case for the “judi-
cial boundness” created by a shared legal consciousness might be made 
were one able to identify instances in which a justice felt constrained to 
reach a result differing from his preferred outcome.
15
 
The period about which Kennedy writes provides numerous illustra-
tions of this phenomenon of “judicial boundness.” Let me mention just a 
few. When future-Justice Edward Douglass White was representing Loui-
siana in the Senate in 1892, he delivered a lengthy speech in opposition 
to the Hatch Anti-Option Bill.
16
 That bill would have imposed prohibi-
tive excise taxes on options contracts concerning certain enumerated 
agricultural commodities.
17
 During that speech then-Senator White 
maintained that the 1886 federal statute imposing an excise tax of two 
cents per pound on colored oleomargarine
18
 had been “objectively con-
stitutional” because on its face it appeared to be designed to raise reve-
nue. At the same time, the statute was “unconstitutional, subjectively” 
because it was in fact designed not to raise revenue but instead to regu-
late a matter reserved to the several states.
19
 White insisted that as a 
                                                                                                                           
 15 I leave to one side, as raising different and more difficult issues of verification, the possi-
bility that a justice’s legal consciousness might be so integral to or constitutive of his political, 
social, or economic consciousness that he experiences no such divergence. For criticism of Ken-
nedy’s conception of the constraints legal consciousness places on the legal imagination as overly 
deterministic, see Fisher, 49 Stan L Rev at 1099 (cited in note 10) (“Kennedy’s formulation seems to 
imply that . . . the intellectual freedom of individual lawyers is dramatically limited. . . . [T]he struc-
turalist portion of his analysis plainly tilts in the direction of determinism.”). 
 16 See 52d Cong, 1st Sess, 23 Cong Rec S 6513–20 (July 21, 1892). 
 17 See Anti-Option Bill, HR 7845, 52d Cong, 1st Sess, in 23 Cong Rec 5071 (June 6, 1892). 
 18 Oleomargarine Act of 1886, 24 Stat 210.  
 19 23 Cong Rec S 6518 (July 21, 1892). 
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senator he “would not vote for a dishonest bill raising revenue,” but he 
conceded that if he were “a judge and the bill came to me, then having 
passed out of this sphere and into another sphere where motives could 
not enter, I should say the sole question presented to me was, does it 
raise revenue on its face, and, if so, I would hold it constitutional.”
20
 
White was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Grover 
Cleveland in 1894. In 1902, Congress amended the 1886 statute to raise 
the excise on colored oleomargarine from two to ten cents per pound.
21
 
The 1886 bill, in its original form, similarly had proposed a ten cent per 
pound excise,
22
 a tax then-Senator White had characterized as “prohibi-
tive” in the Anti-Option Bill debate.
23
 The constitutionality of the 
amended statute was challenged in McCray v United States.
24
 As he had 
suggested he would do on the Senate floor in 1892, now-Justice White 
wrote for the majority upholding the tax. In an opinion laced with ex-
pressions of concern over the possibility of “judicial usurpation” elimi-
nating “the entire distinction between the legislative, judicial, and ex-
ecutive departments of the government, upon which our system is 
founded,”
25
 Justice White rejected the contention “that the judiciary 
may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a 
wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”
26
 
Though White believed that the statute was subjectively unconstitu-
tional and would have voted against it for that reason as a senator, his 
conception of the judicial role prevented him from vindicating that 
conviction in his capacity as a justice.  
Consider next an instance involving Justice Mahlon Pitney. Sec-
tion 10 of the Erdman Act of 1898
27
 prohibited interstate carriers from 
requiring their employees, or any person seeking employment, as a condi-
tion of employment to enter into an agreement not to become or remain 
a member of a labor organization (a so-called “yellow-dog” contract).
28
 
Section 10 further prohibited carriers from threatening any employee 
with loss of employment or discriminating against any employee because 
of his union membership.
29
 During the debates on the bill, no member of 
either house of Congress suggested that this provision was unconstitu-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id at 6519. 
 21 Oleomargarine Act of 1902, Pub L No 57-110, 32 Stat 194. 
 22 HR 8328, 49th Cong, 1st Sess, in 17 Cong Rec H 4911 (May 25, 1886).  
 23 23 Cong Rec at 6518. 
 24 195 US 27 (1904). 
 25 Id at 54. 
 26 Id at 56. 
 27 Erdman Act of 1898, 30 Stat 424. 
 28 Erdman Act § 10, 30 Stat at 428. 
 29 Id.  
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tional,
30
 and Pitney, who was then a representative from New Jersey, 
voted to enact the bill.
31
 In 1908, the Supreme Court in Adair v United 
States
32
 invalidated § 10 as an infringement of the liberty of contract guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment.
33
 Pitney was appointed to the Supreme 
Court by then-President William Howard Taft in 1912. In 1915, the Court 
heard Coppage v Kansas,
34
 which reviewed the conviction of a supervisor 
for the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company for violating a 
Kansas statute prohibiting employers from requiring their employees to 
sign yellow-dog contracts.
35
 Now-Justice Pitney wrote the majority opi-
nion holding that Coppage “cannot be distinguished from Adair” and 
that the Kansas statute therefore deprived employers and employees of 
the liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
36
 
The case of United Mine Workers v Coronado Coal Co
37
 is particu-
larly revealing. The Court had established in United States v E.C. Knight
38
 
that the federal commerce power, and hence the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
did not reach corporate consolidation in the manufacturing sector in the 
absence of a showing of intent to restrain interstate commerce.
39
 Subse-
quent cases demonstrated that the same limiting principle also covered 
attempts to use the Act to enjoin or penalize labor strikes, boycotts, and 
disturbances at manufacturing establishments.
40
 Coronado Coal was such 
a case. The Court unanimously reversed the Sherman Antitrust Act 
judgment against the union that the company had secured below, holding 
that “[c]oal mining is not interstate commerce, and the power of Con-
gress does not extend to its regulation as such.”
41
 Yet Chief Justice Taft’s 
opinion for the Court made no effort to conceal his discomfort with the 
result he understood established doctrine to require. “The circums-
tances,” Taft wrote, which had involved both homicide and arson commit-
                                                                                                                           
 30 For the legislative history, see HR 4372, S 3653, and S 3662, 55th Cong, 2d Sess, in 31 
Cong Rec 74-5566 (1897–98); HR Rep No 55-454, 55th Cong, 2d Sess (1898); S Rep No 55-591, 
55th Cong, 2d Sess (1898).  
 31 See 31 Cong Rec at 5053. 
 32 208 US 161 (1908). 
 33 Id at 172. 
 34 236 US 1 (1915). 
 35 Id at 6–7.  
 36 Id at 13.  
 37 259 US 344 (1922). 
 38 156 US 1 (1895). 
 39 See id at 17 (noting that an indirect effect on trade or commerce “was not enough to 
entitle complainants to a decree”).  
 40 See, for example, Levering & Garrigues v Morrin, 289 US 103, 107 (1933) (finding that 
the aim of a labor strike among New York steelworkers was “not for the purpose of affecting the 
sale or transit of materials in interstate commerce”); United Leather Workers International Union 
v Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co, 265 US 457, 471 (1924) (finding that a leatherworking union’s 
picketing campaign was an “indirect and remote obstruction” to interstate commerce). 
 41 Coronado Coal, 259 US at 407. 
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ted by union members, “are such as to awaken regret that, in our view of 
the federal jurisdiction, we cannot affirm the judgment.”
42
 Justice William 
Day wrote on his return of Chief Justice Taft’s circulated opinion, “I 
agree, and regret that this gross outrage by the local union cannot be 
reached by federal authority.”
43
 Justice James McReynolds, on his return, 
wrote, “I am sorry you can’t make the scoundrels pay,” and Justice Pitney 
quipped, “Too true to be good.”
44
 
Such instances were commonplace during the New Deal. Justices 
Harlan Fiske Stone and Louis Brandeis each disapproved of both the 
National Industrial Recovery Act
45
 (NIRA) and the first Agricultural 
Adjustment Act
46
 (AAA), yet they voted to invalidate the former
47
 and 
to uphold the latter.
48
 Stone’s policy preferences ran against both the 
Railroad Retirement Act of 1934
49
 and the Administration’s legislation 
abrogating the Gold Clause,
50
 yet he voted to uphold each statute.
51
 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id at 413. 
 43 William Howard Taft, 1922 Pres Papers, Reel 615. 
 44 Id.  
 45 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub L No 73-67, 48 Stat 195 (1933).  
 46 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub L No 73-10, 48 Stat 31 (1933). For the justices’ disap-
proval of both laws, see Marian C. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War 
79, 103–05 (Fordham 2002) (“The NIRA was subjected to withering criticism by Justice Brandeis 
both before and after its passage.”); id at 128 (noting that “Justice Stone disliked the AAA and said 
he would not have voted for it” and that “Justice Brandeis also disliked the AAA.”); Lewis Paper, 
Brandeis 345, 347 (Prentice-Hall 1983) (noting that Brandeis “repeatedly warned” members of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration “that they were going down the wrong path” and that 
NIRA “especially disturbed him”); Bruce Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection 139–43 
(Oxford 1982) (“Brandeis formulated a powerful argument against what he viewed as the bigness 
of the AAA.”); Peter Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 140 (Princeton 1982) (describing the report of 
Thomas Reed Powell to Felix Frankfurter in November of 1933 that Brandeis was “very strongly 
opposed” to much of the AAA); Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition 
162 (Little, Brown 1981) (reporting that Brandeis wrote to his daughter in April of 1934 that he saw 
“little to be joyous about in the New Deal measures most talked about: NIRA and AAA seem to be 
going from bad to worse”); Allison Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in Allison Dunham and Phillip 
Kurland, eds, Mr. Justice 229, 231 (Chicago 1964) (“Stone regarded [the AAA] as so bad that, even 
four years later when I first came to know him, he would talk about it in scathing terms.”); Alpheus 
Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 371–75 (Viking 1956) (quoting a letter dated 
March 27, 1934 from Stone to Herbert Hoover deploring “the creation of drastic administrative proce-
dures without legislative definition and without provision for their review by the courts”); id at 416 
(quoting a letter dated January 9, 1936 from Stone to Charles C. Burlingham, in which Stone insisted, 
“You do not dislike the AAA any more than I do”). 
 47 Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495 (1935) (invalidating NIRA as an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power and because it exceeded congressional power regulate commerce). 
 48 United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 78–88 (1936) (Stone dissenting) (arguing that the AAA 
should be upheld as a lawful exercise of congressional taxing power). 
 49 Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-485, 48 Stat 1283. 
 50 A Joint Resolution to Assure Uniform Value to the Coins and Currencies of the United 
States, Pub L No 73-10, 48 Stat 112 (1933) (“Gold Clause legislation”). For details of Stone’s policy 
preferences on these laws, see Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 393 (cited in note 46) (quoting a May 9, 
1935 letter from Stone to Felix Frankfurter: “If I had been a member of Congress, I am certain I should 
have voted against [the Railroad Retirement Act]”); id at 390 (noting that Stone was “sorely troubled” 
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Similarly, Justice Brandeis opposed the Gold Clause legislation yet 
voted to uphold it,
52
 and though he strongly supported the objectives 
of the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act,
53
 he wrote the unanimous 
opinion striking it down.
54
 Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes recorded in his diary that he had spoken with Justice Roberts at 
a dinner party shortly after the Court had rendered its 8-1 decision in 
Panama Refining Co v Ryan
55
 (“Hot Oil Case”) invalidating certain 
provisions of NIRA. Ickes’s diary reveals that on that occasion Justice 
Owen Roberts (who had voted with the majority) “assured me that he 
is entirely sympathetic with what we are trying to do in the oil matter 
and that he hoped that we would pass a statute that would enable us 
to carry out our policy.”
56
 
Robert Jackson, who along with several of his colleagues would 
soon confront similar concerns as he grappled with the issues presented 
by Wickard v Filburn,
57
 wrote in 1941 that liberal presidents had often 
failed in their efforts to reshape the nation’s law through judicial ap-
pointments because “the Court influences appointees more consis-
tently than appointees influence the Court.”
58
 Members of the legal 
profession, he explained, were “much concerned with precedents, au-
thorities, existing customs, usages, vested rights, and established rela-
tionships.”
59
 The lawyer’s “method of thinking” cultivated “a supreme 
                                                                                                                           
by the abrogation of the Gold Clause); Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone at 231 (cited in note 46) (re-
porting that Stone was “so incensed” that “he proposed never again to purchase government bonds”). 
 51 Railroad Retirement Board v Alton Railroad Co, 295 US 330 (1935) (Railroad Retirement 
Act); Nortz v United States, 294 US 317 (1935) (Gold Clause legislation); Norman v Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co, 294 US 240 (1935) (Gold Clause legislation).  
 52 See Paper, Brandeis at 346 (cited in note 46) (“Brandeis put aside his personal feelings 
and supported the majority decision that left the government’s policy intact.”); Stanley Reed 
Oral History Project, Interview with Paul A. Freund *17–18 (unpublished transcript, University 
of Kentucky, Oct 18, 1982) (noting that Brandeis joined the majority opinion upholding the 
constitutionality of the Gold Clause “without enthusiasm”). 
 53 Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, Pub L No 73-486, 48 Stat 1289 (1934).  
 54 Compare Paper, Brandeis at 350 (cited in note 46) (noting that despite Justice Brandeis’s 
sympathy to providing debt relief for farmers, he “could not get around the fact that it simply cut 
off the rights of the person holding the mortgage”), with Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v 
Radford, 295 US 555, 601–02 (1935) (holding that the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act vi-
olated the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just compensation). 
 55 293 US 388 (1935). 
 56 Harold L. Ickes, 1 The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days 1933–1936 
273 (Simon and Shuster 1953).  
 57 317 US 111 (1942). See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 212–22 (Oxford 
1998) (describing the various stages in Jackson’s attempts to “think his way through the com-
merce clause issue”). 
 58 Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy vii (Knopf 1941).  
 59 Id at 313. 
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respect for the past, and its order.”
60
 As Frederic Maitland succinctly 
put the point, “taught law is tough law.”
61
 
Jackson had seen these lawyerly habits of mind as “sustained insti-
tutional and procedural pressures towards conservatism,”
62
 and there is 
a sense in which this is true. But as the examples I have offered sug-
gest, and as the division in Lochner discussed by Kennedy illustrates, 
there were many cases in which these pressures did not produce or 
require conservative political outcomes.
63
 Indeed, the later history of 
the New Deal reveals that the constitutional difficulties faced by por-
tions of the early New Deal had to do not with the policy objectives of 
the invalidated legislation, but instead with the means by which those 
objectives had been sought. Shortly after the Court invalidated the 
Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, Congress enacted legislation de-
signed to achieve the same policy objective while addressing the con-
stitutional objections raised in Justice Brandeis’s unanimous opinion.
64
 
When the revised statute was challenged before the Court in 1937, 
each of the justices—the Four Horsemen
65
 included—joined Bran-
deis’s opinion upholding the new law.
66
 Similarly, shortly after the Hot 
Oil Case decision was rendered, Congress enacted the Connally Act,
67
 
which sought to achieve the objectives of its invalidated predecessor 
while eliminating the delegation feature that the Court had held un-
constitutional. Challenges to the constitutionality of the Act were un-
iformly rejected in the lower federal courts.
68
 When an indictment for 
violating the Act ultimately reached the Court in 1939, the defendants did 
not even allege that the Act was unconstitutional. The unanimous opi-
nion sustaining the indictment was joined by the two remaining Horse-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id at 313–14. 
 61 Frederic W. Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance 18 (Cambridge 1901). See also 
Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 82 (P. Smith 1938) (meditating on the 
“[t]enacity of a taught legal tradition”). 
 62 Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy at vii (cited in note 58).  
 63 For a more general treatment of this point, examining a multitude of cases in which 
“conservative” justices voted in support of “liberal” case outcomes, see generally Barry Cush-
man, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va L Rev 559 (1997). 
 64 Amendment to Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 Stat 943 (1935). 
 65 The Four Horsemen included Justices Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, George Suther-
land, and Willis Van Devanter. See Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va L 
Rev at 559. 
 66 See Wright v Vinton Branch Bank, 300 US 440, 456–70 (1937) (distinguishing the 
amended statute from the original Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act on multiple grounds).  
 67 Connally Act, Pub L No 74-14, 49 Stat 30 (1935). 
 68 See Genecov v Federal Petroleum Board, 146 F2d 596, 597 (5th Cir 1944); The President 
of the United States v Skeen, 118 F2d 58, 59 (5th Cir 1941); Hurley v Federal Tender Board No 1, 
108 F2d 574, 576 (5th Cir 1939); Griswold v The President of the United States, 82 F2d 922, 923 
(5th Cir 1936); President of the United States v Artex Refineries Sales Corp, 11 F Supp 189, 192 
(SD Tex 1935). 
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men, Justices James McReynolds and Pierce Butler.
69
 In 1936, Carter v 
Carter Coal Co
70
 held that the labor regulation provisions of the Guffey-
Snyder Coal Act
71
 of 1935 exceeded the scope of the commerce power, 
and invalidated the Act’s provisions regulating coal prices on the 
ground that those portions of the statute were not severable from the 
objectionable labor provisions.
72
 Congress soon enacted the Bitumin-
ous Coal Act of 1937,
73
 which essentially reenacted the Guffey-Snyder 
Coal Act’s price regulation provisions while omitting its labor provi-
sions. The Court upheld the revised Act in 1940 over the lone dissent 
of Justice McReynolds.
74
 The 1936 decision in United States v Butler
75
 saw 
Chief Justice Hughes join Justice Roberts’s majority opinion striking 
down the AAA of 1933 as an unconstitutional effort to regulate agricul-
tural production through the use of the taxing and spending powers.
76
 The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,
77
 by contrast, sought to buoy the 
sagging prices of agricultural commodities not by limiting their produc-
tion but instead by regulating their marketing in interstate commerce.
78
 
When the revised Act was challenged before the Court in 1939, Hughes 
joined Roberts’s majority opinion upholding the statute as a legitimate 
exercise of the commerce power.
79
 
In these instances, congressmen and commentators professed 
faith that the revised legislation would pass muster where the earlier 
initiatives had failed. Representatives and senators who had voted 
against the earlier bills because they judged them to be unconstitu-
tional supported the second wave of legislation, which they believed 
had addressed the concerns they had harbored over the first wave.
80
 
The decisions invalidating the earlier New Deal statutes were not 
simple manifestations of personal distaste for their respective policy 
goals. They were instead lawyerly objections to the failures of Con-
                                                                                                                           
 69 United States v Powers, 307 US 214 (1939). 
 70 298 US 238 (1936). 
 71 Guffey-Snyder Coal Act, Pub L No 74-402, 49 Stat 991 (1935). 
 72 Carter Coal, 298 US at 316.  
 73 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Pub L No 75-48, 50 Stat 72. 
 74 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co v Adkins, 310 US 381, 403–04 (1940). 
 75 297 US 1 (1936). 
 76 Butler, 297 US at 68. 
 77 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub L No 75-430, 52 Stat 31. 
 78 Id at 45–62. 
 79 Mulford v Smith, 307 US 38, 48 (1939) (holding that the provisions of the act in question 
regulated interstate and foreign commerce rather than production, and thus were within con-
gressional authority). For a fuller treatment of the cases and legislation discussed in this para-
graph, see generally Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998 J 
S Ct Hist 79. 
 80 See Cushman, 1998 J S Ct Hist at 81–94 (cited in note 79) (discussing the means by which 
Congress sought with the second wave of legislation to remedy the constitutional difficulties pla-
guing the first wave).  
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gress to seek its objectives through legal forms consistent with the 
requirements of constitutional doctrine as understood by the justices. 
The constraints these justices experienced were not those of policy 




Kennedy is interested not merely in the fact of classical legal con-
sciousness but also in its structure and operation. Classical legal 
thought, he argues, “amounted to a rationalistic ordering of the whole 
legal universe” (p 1) into “formal arrangement[s]” (p 27), reducing an 
“enormous mass of rules and standards” to “a much smaller number 
with a definite pattern” (p 7). These “elements” of legal consciousness 
were ordered through their “integration” into structures that Kennedy 
calls “subsystems” (p 16). Subsystems are integrated along two dimen-
sions, the “vertical” and the “horizontal.” A subsystem is integrated 
along the vertical dimension where there is “a connection between an 
abstract proposition (contract protects will of the parties) and a par-
ticular rule (expectation damages)” (p 21). Horizontal integration 
concerns “the question of how many of the doctrinal areas or fields 
within legal consciousness have been assimilated to a particular inte-
grating sub-system or structure” (p 20), as well as “the manner in 
which they are related to one another” (p 28). Kennedy offers as an 
example of horizontal integration the issues raised in In re Debs:  
We have to decide whether, in the absence of a relevant statute, the 
federal government can get an injunction from a federal court 
against a railroad strike on the ground that the strike has inter-
rupted interstate commerce. First, is it relevant that the courts would 
grant an injunction against a state statute which discriminated 
against interstate commerce through unequal taxation? Second, is it 
relevant that a private party, under the private law of nuisance, can 
obtain an injunction against a house of prostitution (p 17)?  
In answering these questions in the affirmative, Kennedy observes:  
Brewer’s opinion supplied the total absence of closely analogous 
precedents with what he took to be logical inferences from prece-
dents about the relation of federal commerce power to state police 
power, about the power of a state to remove physical obstruction 
                                                                                                                           
 81 As Charles Curtis wrote of the New Deal Court, “It is absurd to think that these Justices 
would have reasoned as they did to us in these opinions, if they had been asked to give, not judi-
cial opinions, but solutions of our national problems.” Charles Curtis, Lions under the Throne 190 
(Houghton Mifflin 1947).  
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from highways and water-ways, and about the abatement by in-
junction of nuisances in general (p 20). 
The vertical and horizontal integration of rules and principles 
within a subsystem in turn creates logical and analogical pressures on 
those whose legal consciousness is comprised in part by that subsys-
tem. As Kennedy explains, “[I]f your position about X puts a good 
deal of moral and intellectual pressure on you to take a particular po-
sition with respect to Y, then the two are part of a subsystem” (pp 16–
17). Whether one experiences the relation between two rules as one of 
necessary logical inference or of compelling analogy, Kennedy main-
tains that “[e]ach of these modes of interrelation involves the expe-
rience of being bound, to some extent, to do X as an implication of 
commitment to Y” (p 21). Kennedy refers to this capacity of certain 
rules or principles to generate “concrete prescriptions that are felt to 
be inescapable” as “operativeness” (p 28).
82
 Classical legal thought was 
in this sense “a structured whole with a great deal of internal consis-
tency and a powerful internal logic” (p 242).
83
 
Kennedy contends that Classical legal thought was organized by 
four fundamental legal relations: the relation between private citizen 
and private citizen, the relation between private citizen and state, the 
relation between the state and federal governments, and the relation 
between the legislature and the judiciary. Before the Civil War, Ken-
nedy maintains, the American legal elite conceived of these relations 
as “qualitatively distinct from one another and as operated legally 
according to qualitatively distinct principles” (p 2). He notes, however:  
During the Classical period, the legal elite conceived these four 
institutional relationships as four particular instances of a single 
general relation: each of them was an example of the delegation 
of legal powers absolute within their spheres.
84
 The role of the ju-
                                                                                                                           
 82 Kennedy believes that “[w]ith the disintegration of Classicism, there has been something 
close to a disappearance” of this “experience that appears to have been common at the turn of 
the [twentieth] century” and, with it, a decline in the credibility of “claims to an objective basis 
for judicial review . . . that seemed perfectly plausible” during the classical age (p 25). 
 83 Compare the contemporaneous formulation of English historian, E.P. Thompson: law 
“has its own characteristics, its own independent history and logic of evolution.” E.P. Thompson, 
Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 262 (Allen Lane 1975). 
 84 Over time, Kennedy maintains, certain features of these fundamental relations came to 
bear a greater resemblance to one another. By 1885 there was “such a marked similarity” be-
tween the citizen-citizen and state-citizen relations “that it was an easy matter for thinkers so 
inclined to put them together into a single integrated Classical theory of law” (p 93). So, Kenne-
dy offers by way of example that “[b]y 1898 . . . [t]he freedom of contract protected by the 14th 
Amendment against legislative interference was the same entity as the freedom of contract 
enforced by the common law in litigation between businessmen” (p 41), and that by 1900, “the 
rights the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed against state abridgment got their legal definition 
from common law rules governing the relations of neighbors” (p 91). 
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diciary (its sphere of absolute power) was the application of a 
single, distinctively legal, analytic apparatus to the job of policing 
the boundaries of these spheres (pp 2–3).  
Within this system, the federal judiciary assumed the role “of umpire 
and line drawer” (p 39), the “absolute master of the operation of 
drawing the boundary lines between spheres, using a technique of 
construction of the Constitution that was legal rather than prudential or 
political” (p 41). It was thought that the employment of this “objective, 
quasi-scientific” and “peculiar legal technique” of “elaborating general 
principles” (p 6) prevented judicial usurpation of the authority of legis-
latures and citizens. Judges did not make law; they simply applied it in 
an impersonal, neutral fashion. They did not exercise will; instead, they 
merely carried out the will of other autonomous legal actors (p 253).  
This idea of powers “absolute within” their spheres but “void out-
side” them (p 6) could benefit from some refinement. With respect to 
federal-state relations, it does not capture areas of concurrent power, 
such as that existing with respect to the regulation of interstate com-
merce under the doctrine of Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of 
Philadelphia
85
 that persisted during the classical period.
86
 Concerning 
the public-private distinction, it seduces Kennedy into claiming that 
                                                                                                                           
 85 53 US 299 (1851). The taxing and bankruptcy powers were similarly concurrent. 
 86 See, for example, Clason v Indiana, 306 US 439, 443 (1939) (upholding a statute requir-
ing license to transport large dead animals not slaughtered for human consumption on the state 
highways as an “appropriate sanitary measure whose effect upon interstate commerce, if any, is 
merely incidental”); Mintz v Baldwin, 289 US 346, 350 (1933) (upholding a cattle inspection law); 
Corn Products Refining Co v Eddy, 249 US 427, 432 (1919) (upholding a Kansas requirement 
that corn syrup containers include a label displaying ingredients despite its “incidental interfe-
rence” with interstate commerce); Erie Railroad Co v Williams, 233 US 685, 704 (1914) (uphold-
ing a New York statute requiring common carriers to pay their employees on a semimonthly 
basis); Standard Stock Food Co v Wright, 225 US 540, 549–50 (1912) (upholding an inspection 
charge for stock food); Savage v Jones, 225 US 501, 528–29 (1912) (same); Reid v Colorado, 187 
US 137, 148–49 (1902) (upholding a cattle quarantine law); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a 
Vapeur v Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 US 380, 390–91 (1902) (permitting a state to re-
strict travel through quarantined areas); Smith v St. Louis and Southwestern Railway Co, 181 US 
248, 257–58 (1901) (upholding a quarantine statute); Rasmussen v Idaho, 181 US 198, 201–02 
(1901) (upholding a statute forbidding shipment of diseased cattle into the state); Lindsay and 
Phelps Co v Mullen, 176 US 126, 146–48 (1900) (allowing lumber inspections); Patapsco Guano 
Co v North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 US 345, 361 (1898) (allowing fertilizer inspec-
tions); Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co v Haber, 169 US 613, 627 (1898) (upholding a 
cattle quarantine statute); Morgan’s Steamship Co v Louisiana Board of Health, 118 US 455, 465 
(1886) (upholding quarantine laws); Escanaba Co v Chicago, 107 US 678, 687 (1882) (holding 
that states have plenary control over navigable rivers until Congress acts); Munn v Illinois, 94 US 
113, 135 (1877) (permitting state regulation of grain elevator rates). Kennedy is not alone in 
overstating the exclusive character of postbellum federalism—I, too, have been guilty. See 
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 141–42 (cited in note 57). For my own small effort 
at redemption, see Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 
67 U Chi L Rev 1089, 1114–16 (2000). 
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“[w]ith respect to . . . the regulation of railroads and other activities ‘af-
fected with a public interest’ . . . the legislature was a legal power holder 
able to command absolute obedience to its will objectively construed” 
(p 254). As is demonstrated by Smyth v Ames
87
 and its progeny, invali-
dating “confiscatory” public transportation and utility rate regulations,
88
 
as well as numerous other cases of the period,
89
 this is a considerable 
                                                                                                                           
 87 169 US 466 (1898). 
 88 See, for example, West v Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co of Baltimore, 295 US 662, 
671 (1935) (telephone rates); Western Ohio Gas Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (No 2), 294 
US 79, 80–83 (1935) (gas rates); Western Ohio Gas Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (No 1), 
294 US 63, 67–77 (1935) (gas rates); Columbus Gas and Fuel Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 
292 US 398, 404–05 (1934) (gas rates); Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co v Railroad Commission, 290 
US 264, 275 (1933) (gas rates); Railroad Commission v Maxcy, 282 US 249, 250–51 (1931) (water 
rates); United Railways and Electric Co of Baltimore v West, 280 US 234, 249 (1930) (street railway 
fares); Denney v Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co, 276 US 97, 101–04 (1928) (telephone rates); 
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway v Public Utilities Commission, 274 US 344, 350–52 (1927) 
(railroad rates); Ottinger v Brooklyn Union Gas Co, 272 US 579, 580–81 (1926) (gas rates); McCardle v 
Indianapolis Water Co, 272 US 400, 410–21 (1926) (water rates); Patterson v Mobile Gas Co, 271 US 
131, 134–35 (1926) (gas rates); Board of Public Utility Commissioners v New York Telephone Co, 271 
US 23, 31–32 (1926) (telephone rates); Smith v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 270 US 587, 590–92 (1926) 
(telephone rates); Banton v Belt Line Railway, 268 US 413, 419–25 (1925) (street railway fares); North-
ern Pacific Railway v Department of Public Works, 268 US 39, 42–45 (1925) (railroad rates); Ohio 
Utilities Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 267 US 359, 364 (1925) (electricity rates); Pacific 
Gas and Electric Co v City of San Francisco, 265 US 403, 405–16 (1924) (gas rates); Bluefield Water 
Works and Improvement Co v Public Service Commission, 262 US 679, 690 (1923) (water rates); 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Public Service Commission, 262 US 276, 287–89 (1923) (telephone 
rates); Prendergast v New York Telephone Co, 262 US 43, 50–51 (1923) (telephone rates); City of Padu-
cah v Paducah Railway, 261 US 267, 275 (1923) (electric street car fares); City of Houston v Southwes-
tern Bell Telephone Co, 259 US 318, 321–25 (1922) (telephone rates); Newton v Consolidated Gas Co, 
258 US 165, 174–78 (1922) (gas rates); City of San Antonio v San Antonio Public Service Co, 255 US 
547, 555–58 (1921) (street railway fares); Southern Iowa Electric Co v City of Chariton, 255 US 539, 
542–46 (1921) (electricity rates); Vandalia Railroad v Schnull, 255 US 113, 118–22 (1921) (railroad 
rates); Groesbeck v Duluth, South Shore and Atlantic Railway Co, 250 US 607, 609 (1919) (railroad 
rates); Detroit United Railway v City of Detroit, 248 US 429, 436 (1919) (street railway fares); City of 
Denver v Denver Union Water Co, 246 US 178, 194 (1918) (water rates); Rowland v Boyle, 244 US 106, 
107–11 (1917) (railroad rates); Norfolk and Western Railway Co v Conley, 236 US 605, 614 (1915) 
(railroad rates); Northern Pacific Railway Co v McCue, 236 US 585, 601 (1915) (railroad rates); San 
Joaquin and Kings River Canal and Irrigation Co v County of Stanislaus, 233 US 454, 458–61 (1914) 
(water rates); The Missouri Rate Cases, 230 US 474, 507–09 (1913) (railroad rates); The Minnesota Rate 
Cases, 230 US 352, 433–73 (1913) (railroad rates). 
 89 See, for example, Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railway Co v United States, 284 US 
80, 100 (1931) (invalidating an agency rule that favored short railroad lines by exempting them 
from statutory payments that applied to all railroads); Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha 
Railway Co v Holmberg, 282 US 162, 164 (1930) (invalidating a requirement that a railroad build 
an underground cattle pass); Great Northern Railway Co v Cahill, 253 US 71, 77 (1920) (invali-
dating an order requiring a railroad to install and maintain scales); Brooks-Scanlon Co v Rail-
road Commission of Louisiana, 251 US 396, 399 (1920) (invalidating a requirement that a rail-
road continue to operate at a loss); Mississippi Railroad Commission v Mobile and Ohio Rail-
road Co, 244 US 388, 396 (1917) (invalidating a requirement that a railroad restore certain pas-
senger trains to service); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad Co v Wisconsin, 238 US 491, 
499 (1915) (invalidating a state statute penalizing railroads for their arrangement of beds); Great 
Northern Railway Co v State Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 238 US 340, 345–47 (1915) 
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overstatement. But Kennedy’s claim that the period’s constitutional 
law divided the world into spheres of federal and state authority and 
of public and private right has considerable descriptive power. In the 
balance of this Review I propose to show, in a highly compressed fa-
shion, how what Kennedy would call integration within and between 
those subsystems can help to explain aspects of the development, 
functioning, and “fall” of classical constitutional law.
90
 
Consider first the relation between affirmative and dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In the years following the Civil War, 
the Court developed an interpretation of the Commerce Clause treat-
ing its grant to Congress of power to regulate commerce among the 
several states as exclusive. Where the subject regulated was interstate 
commerce, it fell within the sole jurisdiction of Congress. State and 
local governments could tax or regulate “local” matters but were po-
werless to encroach upon this “national” domain. This interpretation 
of the commerce power as exclusive enabled the Court to break down 
state and local barriers to interstate trade such as taxing, licensing, and 
inspection statutes designed to favor local interests.
91
 Yet it might, if 
“followed to its logical conclusion,” have resulted in the implied con-
stitutional preemption of any state or local action having some effect 
on interstate commerce.
92
 Contemporaries realized that such an inter-
pretation threatened to eviscerate state and local government and to 
leave significant portions of American economic life unregulated.
93
 
The Court avoided this potential hazard by determining that regula-
tions imposing a “direct” burden on interstate commerce were uncons-
                                                                                                                           
(invalidating an order requiring railroads to install and maintain scales); Chicago, Milwaukee, 
and St. Paul Railway v Polt, 232 US 165, 167 (1914) (invalidating a penalty statute doubling jury-
imposed damages on due process grounds); Missouri Pacific Railway Co v Tucker, 230 US 340, 
351 (1913) (invalidating a statute imposing liquid damages of $500 on railroads for each violation 
of rate controls); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Southern Railway Co v Wynne, 224 US 354, 358 
(1912) (invalidating penalty statute doubling railroads’ liability for the killing of livestock); Mis-
souri Pacific Railway Co v Nebraska, 217 US 196, 207 (1910) (invalidating a mandate that a 
railroad install side tracks to grain elevators); Missouri Pacific Railway Co v Nebraska, 164 US 
403, 417 (1896) (invalidating a requirement that a railroad grant an easement on its property for 
purpose of building a grain elevator). 
 90 Kennedy appears to believe that the fall of Classical legal thought can be attributed pri-
marily to a breakdown in its operativeness along the vertical dimension (pp xix, 250–52, 261–63). 
The account that follows, by contrast, suggests that its disintegration was in several particulars 
shaped by operative forces along the horizontal dimension. 
 91 See Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1101–08 (cited in note 86). 
 92 Bernard C. Gavit, The Commerce Clause 8–9 (Principia 1932) (noting that the preemp-
tion of state action would have forced “Congress to legislate immediately and in detail”). 
 93 See, for example, George G. Reynolds, The Distribution of Power to Regulate Interstate 
Carriers between the Nation and the States 77 (Columbia 1928); Frederick H. Cooke, The Com-
merce Clause 120 (Baker, Voorhis 1908); David Walter Brown, The Exclusive Power of Congress 
to Regulate Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 4 Colum L Rev 490, 491 (1904); Louis M. Greeley, 
What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce?, 1 Harv L Rev 159, 181 (1887).  
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titutional, but that exercises of the police or taxing powers that affected 
interstate commerce only “indirectly” or “incidentally” were permissi-
ble.
94
 The paradigmatically “local” activities, the regulation and taxation 
of which affected interstate commerce only “indirectly,” were those of 
production—mining, manufacturing, and agriculture.
95
 
These categories—distinguishing “local” from “national activi-
ties,” “production” from “commerce,” and “direct” from “indirect” 
effects on commerce—became key points of integration between 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its affirmative counter-
part. From the late nineteenth century through the mid-1930s, in such 
leading cases as E.C. Knight and Carter Coal, the Court routinely held 
that activities of production were “local” rather than “national,” af-
fected interstate commerce “indirectly” rather than “directly,” and 
were therefore beyond the reach of the power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce. In doing so, these decisions relied principally on 
precedents drawn from the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause juri-
sprudence.
96
 For decades, jurists and treatise writers viewed these two 
lines of doctrine as parts of an integrated whole.
97
 Only when the Court 
finally abandoned these categories in the affirmative Commerce 
Clause case of Wickard were the two lines of doctrine decoupled,
98
 and 
dormant Commerce Clause reoriented around norms of interest ba-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1110–20 (cited in note 86). 
 95 See, for example, Champlin Refining Co v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 
US 210, 235 (1932) (petroleum production); Utah Power and Light Co v Pfost, 286 US 165, 182 
(1932) (electricity generation); Leonard and Leonard v Earle, 279 US 392, 397 (1929) (oyster 
packing); Hope Natural Gas Co v Hall, 274 US 284, 288 (1927) (production of natural gas); Oliv-
er Iron Mining Co v Lord, 262 US 172, 179 (1923) (iron ore mining); Crescent Cotton Oil Co v 
Mississippi, 257 US 129, 136 (1921) (cotton ginning); American Manufacturing Co v City of St. 
Louis, 250 US 459, 464 (1919) (manufacturing); Armour and Co v Virginia, 246 US 1, 7 (1918) 
(manufacturing); Capital City Dairy Co v Ohio, 183 US 238, 245 (1902) (manufacture of colored 
oleomargarine); Kidd v Pearson, 128 US 1, 20–21 (1888) (manufacturing); McCready v Virginia, 
94 US 391, 396–97 (1877) (oyster planting). 
 96 Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1097–99, 1124–26, 1134 (cited in note 86) (discussing affir-
mative Commerce Clause decisions restricting federal regulatory authority and relying upon 
dormant Commerce Clause precedents).  
 97 See generally F.D.G. Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce (Columbia 1937); 
Gavit, The Commerce Clause (cited in note 92); Frederick N. Judson, The Law of Interstate 
Commerce and Its Federal Regulation (T.H. Flood 2d ed 1912); Cooke, The Commerce Clause 
(cited in note 93); Thomas H. Calvert, Regulation of Commerce under the Federal Constitution 
(Thompson 1907); Paul Jones, The Commercial Power of Congress (privately printed, 1904); 
E. Parmalee Prentice and John G. Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (Callag-
han 1898); William Draper Lewis, The Federal Power over Commerce and Its Effects on State Action 
(UPenn 1892). 
 98 See Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1137–46 (cited in note 86) (discussing Justice Jackson’s 
efforts in Wickard to jettison the national-local and direct-indirect distinctions as ill-suited to 
“the complexity of causation in the modern American economy”). 
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lancing and antidiscrimination.
99
 It was no mere coincidence that the 
Court jettisoned the older categories of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence less than two months after Wickard was decided.
100
 
Kennedy believes that the post–Civil War conception of the rela-
tion between the state and federal governments “served as a model or 
exemplar or paradigm in the construction” of the conception of the re-
lation between citizen and state expressed in the public-private distinc-
tion (p 40). This claim was at least debatable even at the time Kennedy 
was writing. By 1971, Harry Scheiber had shown how the public-private 
matrix that had organized the law of riparian rights, eminent domain, 
and tax subsidies in antebellum state court jurisprudence provided the 
template for the category of the “business affected with a public inter-
est” that organized the Supreme Court’s rate and price regulation juri-
sprudence after the 1877 decision in Munn v Illinois.
101
 But there can be 
little doubt that the public-private distinction provided a similarly po-
werful integrating framework for postbellum constitutional doctrine. In 
1975, the year in which Kennedy completed his manuscript, Charles 
McCurdy published an article in which he demonstrated that Justice 
Stephen Field’s views on the various constitutional limitations on public 
regulatory and promotional authority found expression in “an extraor-
dinarily consistent body of immutable rules designed to separate the 
public and private sectors into fixed and inviolable spheres.”
102
 
The public-private distinction similarly played a central role in 
organizing and integrating economic substantive due process jurispru-
dence in the era of Classical legal thought. Just as rates and prices could 
be regulated where the business in question was affected with a public 
interest,
103
 so wages and compensation could be regulated where the 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See id at 1147–48 (describing the uncertainties created by Wickard’s shift in Commerce 
Clause doctrine). See also generally Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: 
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091 (1986).  
 100 Parker v Brown, 317 US 341, 362–63, 367 (1943) (refusing to analyze state regulations as 
imposing “direct” or “indirect” burdens on interstate commerce, and instead upholding a regula-
tion “upon a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances” after “comparing the 
relative weights of the conflicting local and national interests involved”).  
 101 94 US 113 (1877). See generally Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain 
and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, 
eds, Law in American History 329 (Harvard 1971).  
 102 Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Rela-
tions: Some Parameters of Laissez-faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J Am Hist 970, 973 (1975). 
 103 See, for example, Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen, 262 US 1, 40 (1923) (grain ex-
changes); Producers Transportation Co v Railroad Commission, 251 US 228, 231 (1920) (oil 
pipelines); Van Dyke v Geary, 244 US 39, 47 (1917) (water utilities); German Alliance Insurance 
Co v Kansas, 233 US 389, 411–13 (1914) (fire insurance); Cotting v Kansas City Stockyards Co, 
183 US 79, 91 (1901) (public stockyards); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co v Iowa, 94 
US 155, 161 (1877) (railroads); Munn, 94 US at 132 (grain elevators). 
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work in question was performed for such a business,
104
 or for a govern-
ment contractor.
105
 Where the business in question was private, however, 
neither the rates or prices it charged,
106
 nor the compensation it paid 
those in its employ,
107
 could be fixed by legislative authority.
108
 
In 1934, Justice Roberts announced for a 5-4 majority that legisla-
tive authority to regulate rates and prices would no longer be confined 
to businesses traditionally regarded as affected with a public interest.
109
 
Legal observers, ranging from Robert Hale to the Four Horsemen, 
understood this declaration to entail the abandonment of “the corol-
lary rule as to wage-fixing.”
110
 When those expectations were disap-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See, for example, O’Gorman & Young v Hartford Fire Insurance Co, 282 US 251, 257 
(1931) (commissions for agents selling fire insurance); Tagg Brothers and Moorhead v United 
States, 280 US 420, 439 (1930) (commissions for agents selling livestock at public stockyards); 
Wilson v New, 243 US 332, 346 (1917) (wages for railroad employees). 
 105 See, for example, Atkin v Kansas, 191 US 207, 224 (1903) (upholding a Kansas statute 
regulating compensation of workers employed by or on behalf of the state or its municipalities). 
 106 See, for example Williams v Standard Oil Co, 278 US 235, 239 (1929) (retail gasoline 
sales); Ribnik v McBride, 277 US 350, 355 (1928) (employment agencies); Tyson & Brother v 
Banton, 273 US 418, 439–41 (1927) (theater ticket brokers). 
 107 See, for example, Adkins v Children’s Hospital, 261 US 525, 554 (1923) (hotel and hospital 
workers); Murphy v Sardell, 269 US 530, 530 (1925) (per curiam) (following Adkins without opi-
nion); Donham v West-Nelson Manufacturing Co, 273 US 657, 657 (1927) (per curiam) (same). 
 108 The doctrine concerning regulation of working hours was more complex, as the hours 
worked by employees of private businesses might nevertheless be subject to limitations for health 
and safety reasons under the police power. See, for example, Bunting v Oregon, 243 US 426, 434 (1917) 
(workers in mills and manufacturing establishments); Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412, 416 (1908) (wom-
en); Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 395 (1898) (miners). Statutes limiting working hours in private busi-
nesses were, however, more susceptible to successful challenge than were those regulating public 
contractors and businesses affected with a public interest. Compare, for example, Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co v Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 US 612, 618 (1911) (railroads); Atkin, 191 US 
at 224 (public contractors), with Charles Wolff Packing Co v Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, 
267 US 552, 563 (1925) (meat packers); Lochner v New York, 198 US at 64 (bakeries). 
 109 Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502, 531–36 (1934). 
 110 See Thomas C. Chapin, Stare Decisis and Minimum Wages, 9 U Colo L Rev 297, 306 
(1937) (arguing that Nebbia foreshadowed future Court decisions upholding minimum-wage 
laws). See also Nebbia, 291 US at 555 (McReynolds dissenting) (“The argument advanced here 
would support general prescription of prices for farm products, groceries, shoes, clothing, all the 
necessities of modern civilization, as well as labor, when some legislature finds and declares such 
action advisable and for the public good.”); Robert Hale, Minimum Wages and the Constitution, 
36 Colum L Rev 629, 633 (1936) (suggesting that Nebbia had overruled Adkins); Morris Duane, 
Government Regulation of Prices in Competitive Business, 10 Temp L Rev 262, 264 (1936) (noting 
that Nebbia “practically overruled a number of cases in which the Court had held state price 
fixing a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; also another number 
in which state control of hours and wages had been declared invalid—a very similar problem”); 
John E. Hannigan, Minimum Wage Legislation and Litigation, 16 BU L Rev 845, 865 (1936) 
(“[T]he Nebbia case doctrine, if applied to the Adkins case, would have sustained the law.”); 
Hugh Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States 736 (Principia 1936) (remarking that Nebbia 
constitutes “a prophecy” that Adkins “will be overruled whenever a case giving the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to do so is presented to it”); Recent Cases, 85 U Pa L Rev 109, 118 (1936) 
(arguing that wages “are but the price of a commodity which is sold to employers, and the labor 
and health of women are easily as essential to the welfare of a state as is milk”); Thomas Rae-
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pointed in Morehead v Tipaldo,
111
 legal commentators expressed un-
derstandable surprise.
112
 Yet when Justice Roberts’s vote the following 
year to uphold the Washington state minimum wage law in West Coast 
Hotel v Parrish
113
 fulfilled those expectations, commentators contended 
that his anomalous performance in Tipaldo had been driven not by his 
views on the doctrinal merits but by some more technical legal con-
sideration.
114
 One contemporary, who was among those who believed 
                                                                                                                           
burn White, Constitutional Protection of Liberty of Contract: Does It Still Exist?, 83 U Pa L Rev 
425, 438, 440 (1935) (remarking that the Court “has in effect surrendered its power to declare 
void acts of legislature on the ground that they infringe liberty of contract” and that state legisla-
tures now “may fix the rates of wages and the hours of labor”); Norman J. Macbeth, Jr., Note, 
Present Status of the Adkins Case, 24 Ky L J 59, 66 (1935) (speculating that had Justices Hughes 
and Roberts “been on the court in 1923, it is highly improbable that they would have concurred 
in the Adkins decision” and that in light of Nebbia, it seems “probable that they will now refuse 
to follow the Adkins doctrine”); Note, Nebbia v. People: A Milestone, 82 U Pa L Rev 619, 619, 
622 (1934) (asserting that the change wrought by Nebbia is “so great as to overrule for all prac-
tical purposes a host of cases decided in recent years under the due process clause” and that it is 
now “possible that a state may legally regulate all its businesses even to the extent of fixing 
prices, wages, and hours of labor”); Francis W. Matthys, Recent Decision, 9 Notre Dame L Rev 
468, 470 (1934) (stating that Nebbia “clinch[ed] the battle . . . . No longer may a man cry out 
‘Unconstitutional!’ against every law that seems to restrict his freedom of contract or to deprive 
him of his property . . . . The gateway to social legislation has at last been opened.”); Alpheus 
Thomas Mason, Labor, the Courts, and Section 7(a), 28 Am Polit Sci Rev 999, 1007–08 (1934) 
(arguing that Nebbia “augurs well for minimum wage regulations”); Joseph H. Mueller, Note, 
Price Fixing, 23 Ill Bar J 89, 91 (1934) (asserting that Nebbia “is noteworthy for it would scarcely 
be denied from an economic standpoint that the regulation of wages, hours of labor, etc., as well 
as price regulation invade the right of private property in a manner clearly affecting price”). 
 111 298 US 587, 611 (1936) (following Adkins to hold a state minimum wage law for women 
unconstitutional).  
 112 See id at 635–36 (Stone dissenting) (arguing that Nebbia “should control the present 
case,” is “irreconcilable with the decision and most that was said in the Adkins case,” and has 
“left the Court free of [Adkins’s] restriction as a precedent. . . . We should follow our decision in 
the Nebbia case”). See also Olin Browder, Jr., Note, Validity of New York Minimum Wage Law, 
25 Ill Bar J 75, 76 (1936) (contending that the authority of Nebbia provided “a further ground to 
support the validity of [the New York minimum wage] statute which might reasonably have been 
accepted by the Court.”); Louis H. Rubenstein, The Minimum Wage Law, 11 St John’s L Rev 78, 
82–83 (1936) (speculating that, in light of Nebbia, “one would have felt confident that the New 
York minimum wage law could successfully withstand charges of unconstitutionality”); Com-
ment, 34 Mich L Rev 1180, 1187 (1936) (“[I]t seems very difficult to understand why prices can be 
fixed without violating due process, but wages cannot be. Both interfere with liberty of contract.”). 
 113 300 US 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins and distinguishing Tipaldo in upholding a 
state minimum wage law for women). 
 114 See Kurt Stern, Note, Recent Interpretation by the Supreme Court of Liberty of Contract 
in Employment Cases, 11 U Cin L Rev 82, 89 (1937) (arguing that, in light of Nebbia, “the real 
reason for the holding in the Morehead case is the weight of stare decisis”); Paul Y. Davis, The 
Washington Minimum Wage Decision, 12 Ind L J 415, 417 (1937) (“It now seems clear that Mr. 
Justice Roberts’ concurrence in an opinion so at variance with the principle of his own pro-
nouncement in Nebbia v. New York was only obtained because of the supposed procedural bar to 
a re-examination of the Adkins case.”); Chapin, 9 U Colo L Rev at 306 (cited in note 110) (as-
serting that Nebbia had entailed “a liberal ruling in the Morehead Case,” which “went off on a 
technicality”); Olin Browder, Jr., Note, Validity of Washington Minimum Wage Law, 25 Ill Bar J 
284, 286 (1937) (“[C]onsidering the ground of decision in the Morehead case, and considering 
also that it was Justice Roberts who wrote the opinion of the Court in the Nebbia case, his switch 
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that Parrish was entailed by Nebbia, wrote in 1937 that “[t]he interac-
tion of the price-fixing cases and the wage-fixing cases suggests a con-
cise outline of how the conclusion of the logical syllogism may set up 
such stresses as to help compel the revision of the major premise.” 
That “logical syllogism,” he explained, went as follows: 
There can be no price-fixing save in a business affected with a 
public interest [citing Munn]; therefore, since wages are the price 
of labor, there can be no wage-fixing in private business [citing 
Adkins]. But now regulation of prices is permissible like any reg-




For those immersed in the “powerful internal logic” of classical legal cul-
ture, horizontal integration of substantive due process was “operative.” 
Classical public law was characterized by integration not only 
within domains of constitutional doctrine, such as substantive due 
process and the Commerce Clause, but across them as well. Consider 
the so-called “realistic” Commerce Clause doctrines of the classical age: 
the stream of commerce doctrine and the doctrine developed in the 
Shreveport Rate Case.
116
 The former doctrine permitted congressional 
regulation of otherwise “local” activities that were situated in a 
“stream” or “current” of interstate commerce.
117
 But the mere fact that 
a local activity was spatially and temporally situated between two in-
terstate activities was not alone sufficient to support federal regula-
tion. Such a local activity affected interstate commerce “directly” only 
if it was also a business affected with a public interest. The integration 
of this due process limitation into this Commerce Clause doctrine 
served to limit both the range of its application and the extent of its 
deviation from the Knight line of cases. Before 1937, the Court upheld 
federal regulation of a local activity under the stream of commerce 
doctrine in only four cases.
118
 Three involved transactions at public 
                                                                                                                           
to the liberal side [in Parrish] can be sufficiently explained without resorting to political explana-
tions.”); Note, Progress in the Minimum Wage Struggle, 22 Iowa L Rev 565, 570–71 (1937). For my 
own assessment, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 92–104 (cited in note 57). 
 115 Chapin, 9 U Colo L Rev at 309 & n 81 (cited in note 110). Chapin concluded that Ro-
berts’s “real change of heart was not in 1937, then, but in 1934, with the Nebbia case.” Id at 307. 
 116 Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co v United States, 234 US 342 (1914) (“Shreve-
port Rate Case”).  
 117 See, for example, Stafford v Wallace, 258 US 495, 514–16, 519 (1922); Chicago Board of 
Trade, 262 US at 33–34 (1923).  
 118 See Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1126–29 (cited in note 86) (arguing that the “affected 
with a public interest” due process constraint restrained federal power to regulate local activi-
ties); Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 141–51 (cited in note 57) (discussing the view 
that the “current of commerce” and “affected with a public interest” doctrines “would operate as 
reciprocal restraints on federal power”). 
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stockyards,
119
 and the fourth concerned transactions on the Chicago 
Board of Trade.
120
 As the Court pointed out in its opinions, each of 
these businesses was affected with a public interest.
121
 
The Shreveport Rate Case authorized federal regulation of charges 
for intrastate rail carriage, a “local” matter, because of their “close and 
substantial relation to interstate traffic.”
122
 Though this formulation 
taken at face value might be read to authorize extensive regulation of 
local activities, the due process context in which it functioned again 
limited its range of operation. Congressional power to regulate rates 
was limited to that narrow class of businesses, like railroads, that were 
affected with a public interest. Indeed, until the mid-1930s, all of the 
cases upholding federal regulation of local activities under the Shre-
veport doctrine concerned railroads.
123
 
Nebbia’s retirement of the “affected with a public interest” limita-
tion in due process doctrine had dramatic ramifications for both of 
these Commerce Clause doctrines. Thereafter, Congress had power to 
regulate the price at which ordinary commodities like coal, milk, and 
other agricultural commodities were sold in interstate commerce. The 
Shreveport doctrine, in turn, empowered Congress to regulate the 
price at which those goods were sold in intrastate commerce. Congress 
recognized and capitalized on these opportunities with such programs 
as the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,
124
 the Agricultural Marketing 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See Moorhead, 280 US at 435; Stafford, 258 US at 512; Swift and Co v United States, 196 
US 375, 394 (1905). 
 120 See Chicago Board of Trade, 262 US at 33. 
 121 See id at 40–41 (“The Board of Trade conducts a business which is affected with a public 
interest and is, therefore, subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest.”); Stafford, 258 
US at 516 (“[T]he various stockyards of the country . . . conduct a business affected by a public 
use of a national character and subject to national regulation.”). 
 122 234 US at 351–53. 
 123 See Ohio v United States, 292 US 498, 506 (1934); Florida v United States, 292 US 1, 12 
(1934); United States v Louisiana, 290 US 70, 74–75 (1933); Alabama v United States, 279 US 229, 
230 (1929); Colorado v United States, 271 US 153, 164 (1926); United States v Village of Hubbard, 
266 US 474, 476 (1925); Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co v United States, 263 US 456, 474 (1924); 
Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co, 257 US 563, 
579 (1922); Illinois Central Railroad Co v Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, 245 US 493, 506 
(1918); American Express Co v Caldwell, 244 US 617, 624 (1917). The first Supreme Court deci-
sion applying the Shreveport doctrine to an enterprise other than railroads was NLRB v Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 38 (1937) (labor relations in the steel industry). The lower federal 
courts began to apply the Shreveport Rate Case outside the railroad context in 1934. See, for 
example, United States v Gregg, 5 F Supp 848, 854 (SD Texas 1934) (radio broadcasting); United 
States v Shissler, 7 F Supp 123, 127 (ND Ill 1934) (milk distribution); Richmond Hosiery Mills v 
Camp, 7 F Supp 139, 146 (ND Ga 1934) (hosiery manufacture); United States v Canfield Lumber 
Co, 7 F Supp 694, 699 (D Neb 1934) (lumber sales); United States v Wilshire Oil Co, 9 F Supp 396, 
401 (SD Cal, 1934) (petroleum refining); R.C. Tway Coal Co v Glenn, 12 F Supp 570, 592 (WD Ky 
1935) (coal mining); United States v Edwards, 14 F Supp 384, 391 (SD Cal 1936) (fruit packaging). 
 124 See note 73 and accompanying text. 
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Agreement Act,
125
 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,
126
 each 
of which the Court upheld on the authority of the Shreveport Rate Case.
127
 
Nebbia similarly promised to transform the stream of commerce 
doctrine. Because all businesses now were affected with a public inter-
est, formerly “private” enterprises might be located in a current of in-
terstate commerce and thus affect that commerce “directly.”
128
 Lawyers 
defending the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act
129
 
accordingly selected as test cases labor disputes at steel, trailer, and 
manufacturing plants (later referred to as the Labor Board Cases
130
) 
that imported most of their raw materials from other states and shipped 
their finished products in interstate commerce, contending that each of 
those factories was situated in a stream of interstate commerce subject 
to federal regulation.
131
 Their efforts were rewarded with success, and 
such broadened stream of commerce arguments continued to figure 
prominently in legal argument, scholarly commentary, and judicial 
decisions throughout the late 1930s.
132
 
This doctrinal cross-pollination flowed both ways, as Commerce 
Clause concepts came to play an integral role in portions of the Court’s 
due process jurisprudence. From 1908, when the Court invalidated § 10 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, Pub L No 75-137, 50 Stat 246 (1937) (authoriz-
ing the Secretary of Agriculture to set minimum prices at which processors could purchase cer-
tain agricultural commodities from producers). 
 126 See notes 77–78 and accompanying text.  
 127 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 US at 394 (Bituminous Coal Act of 1937); United 
States v Wrightwood Dairy, 315 US 110, 124 (1942) (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act); 
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc v United States, 307 US 588, 595 (1939) (same); United States v Rock 
Royal Cooperative, Inc, 307 US 533, 568 (1939) (same); Mulford, 307 US at 47 (Agricultural 
Adjustment Act). For more detailed treatments of these statutes and the litigation in which they 
were sustained, see Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1132–37 (cited in note 86); Cushman, Rethink-
ing the New Deal Court at 190–207 (cited in note 57).  
 128 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 155 (cited in note 57).  
 129 National Labor Relations Act, Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935).  
 130 NLRB v Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co, 301 US 58, 75 (1937) (clothing manufac-
turer); NLRB v Fruehauf Trailer Co, 301 US 49, 57 (1937) (trailer manufacturer); Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp, 301 US at 31 (steel manufacturer).  
 131 For discussion of the selection of the test cases, and the briefing and arguing of the cases 
on the stream of commerce theory, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 162–68 
(cited in note 57) (describing how the test cases realized the potential of Nebbia to revolutionize 
Commerce Clause doctrine); Irons, The New Deal Lawyers at 254–71 (cited in note 46) (describ-
ing the NLRB lawyers’ “master plan” to uphold the National Labor Relations Act). For an ex-
planation of why the stream of commerce doctrine was not applicable in Schechter Poultry, nor 
in Carter Coal, see Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1132–34 (cited in note 86) (noting that in 
Schechter Poultry, the flow of interstate commerce “had ceased,” while in Carter Coal it “had not 
begun”); Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 156–68 (cited in note 57) (noting that 
Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal did not involve interstate shipments). 
 132 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 162–82, 184–89 (cited in note 57). For 
discussion of the role that the stream of commerce theory played in securing the crucial vote of 
Justice Roberts, see Barry Cushman, Continuity and Change in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 
55 Ark L Rev 1009, 1044–46 (2003); Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 170–75. 
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of the Erdman Act in Adair, to 1937, when the Court upheld the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in the Labor Board Cases, the Court’s juri-
sprudence concerning federal regulation of labor-management relations 
was organized by a common doctrinal model. Federal regulation of 
those relations violated the liberty of contract protected by the Fifth 
Amendment unless two conditions were satisfied: first, the business in 
question was affected with a public interest; and second, there was a 
“real and substantial relation” between the subject of the regulation 
and the protection of interstate commerce. Just as the curtailment of 
contractual liberty by the states in order to protect public health and 
safety might be justified under the police power, so the limitation of 
such liberty by the federal government to protect interstate commerce 
might be justified under the commerce power.
133
 The Adair majority, 
over the astonished dissent of Justice Joseph McKenna,
134
 maintained 
that there was no real and substantial relation between the protection 
of interstate commerce and the Erdman Act’s prohibitions on both 
the use of yellow-dog contracts and discrimination on the basis of un-
ion membership in the railroad industry.
135
 Yet as the justices came to a 
more realistic appraisal of that relation, they became accordingly 
more receptive to federal regulation of the labor relations of enter-
prises engaged in interstate transportation. In 1930, the Court un-
animously upheld provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926
136
 that 
protected the rights of railroad workers to organize and bargain col-
lectively, affirming a lower court order requiring a railroad to reinstate 
employees it had discharged for engaging in lawful union activities.
137
 
In 1937, the Court again unanimously upheld the 1934 amendments to 
the Act requiring carriers to negotiate exclusively and in good faith 
with the selected representatives of their employees.
138
 Also in 1937, 
the Court unanimously sustained application of the National Labor 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 109–38 (cited in note 57). 
 134 208 US at 181, 189 (McKenna dissenting) (“A provision of law which will prevent or 
tend to prevent the stoppage of every wheel in every car of an entire railroad system” had a 
“legal [and] logical connection with interstate commerce”). 
 135 Id at 178–79.  
 136 Railway Labor Act of 1926, Pub L No 69-257, 44 Stat 577.  
 137 See Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co v Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 
281 US 548, 570 (1930) (holding that Congress could take into account the right of employees to 
unionize in issuing regulations to “facilitate the amicable resolution of disputes which threaten 
the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation”). Justice McReynolds did not 
participate. Justice Van Devanter, who had joined the Coppage majority, wrote Chief Justice 
Hughes that he considered the opinion “as near perfect as is humanly possible.” Merlo J. Pusey, 
Charles Evans Hughes 713 (Macmillan 1951).  
 138 Virginian Railway Co v System Federation, No 40, 300 US 515, 553 (1937). 
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Relations Act to an interstate passenger bus company.
139
 Where a busi-
ness was affected with public interest and its labor relations bore a 
real and substantial relationship to interstate commerce, those rela-
tions might be regulated by Congress without infringing the liberty of 
contract secured by the Fifth Amendment. 
Juxtaposing these unanimous decisions upholding federal regula-
tion of labor relations with the closely divided Labor Board Cases of 
1937 helps to illustrate the “operativeness” of the doctrinal integration 
I have been discussing. In each of the cases involving the regulation of 
labor relations at a manufacturing plant, the Four Horsemen pub-
lished a consolidated dissent in which they registered two principal 
objections. One was that the businesses whose labor relations were 
being regulated were not affected with a public interest but instead 
were private.
140
 The second was that the commerce power could nei-
ther provide federal jurisdiction over the employers nor supply the 
commerce power rationale for curtailment of their contractual liber-
ties, as they were manufacturing concerns to which the stream of 
commerce doctrine was inapplicable.
141
 That doctrine had been em-
ployed to reach activities of production in the past, but those businesses 
had been affected with a public interest. To these Nebbia dissenters, the 
distinction between public and private enterprise, as integrated into the 
jurisprudence of labor regulation and the stream of commerce doctrine, 
continued to prescribe the limits of legitimate regulatory authority.
142
 
For the majority justices who had renounced that distinction, such 
restraints no longer obtained. 
The same can be said, moreover, with respect to the application 
of the Shreveport doctrine. Just as the Four Horsemen had repeatedly 
voted to uphold federal regulation of interstate carriers, so had they 
routinely joined opinions upholding federal regulation of intrastate 
aspects of their operations under the Shreveport doctrine.
143
 When 
Congress relied upon that doctrine, as modified by Nebbia, to regulate 
the prices and marketing practices of “private” businesses, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Washington, Virginia, & Maryland Coach Co v NLRB, 301 US 142, 146 (1937) (upholding 
application of the law on the authority of Texas & New Orleans Railroad and Virginian Railway). 
 140 See Friedman-Harry, 301 US at 101–03 (McReynolds dissenting). 
 141 Id at 96-101. 
 142 See id at 97–103 (rejecting the “stream of commerce” argument and insisting that Adair 
and Coppage precluded the federal regulation of the contractual labor relations of “a private own-
er”). For further discussion of the Four Horsemen’s dissent, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court at 136–38, 174–75 (cited in note 57). 
 143 See note 123.  
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the Horsemen balked.
144
 In their view, the public-private distinction 
continued to limit the range of Shreveport’s proper application. 
Consider finally, and in very brief compass, an example that inte-
grates all three of Kennedy’s public law dichotomies: federal-state, pub-
lic-private, and judicial-legislative. In the late nineteenth century, Con-
gress began to take an interest in regulating substances and activities 
that it could not reach through the commerce power by imposing pro-
hibitive excise taxes on them. Each of these was a matter that the states 
might regulate or prohibit under the police power: colored oleomarga-
rine, compound lard, mixed flour, and filled cheese to prevent consumer 
fraud; narcotics and white phosphorus matches to protect health; grain 
and cotton futures contracts to curtail gambling.
145
 Just as legitimate 
police power regulation by the state would not deprive any citizen of 
liberty or property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, so legi-
timate regulation by the federal government would not deprive any 
citizen of his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
146
 There were those in 
Congress who argued that such measures did not impose true taxes but 
were instead regulations of matters reserved to the States, and thus 
transgressed the Tenth Amendment. But it was generally recognized in 
Congress that such objections were not judicially cognizable.
147
 As Chief 
Justice Salmon Chase, in Veazie Bank v Fenno,
148
 said in upholding the 
federal excise on state bank notes:  
[T]he judicial can not prescribe to the legislative department of 
the government limitations upon the exercise of its acknowl-
edged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively 
upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the 
courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.
149
 
Tenth Amendment limitations on exercises of the taxing power, it was 
believed, could be imposed only by the political branches. 
This view was confirmed by Chief Justice White in McCray v United 
States,
150
 which upheld a ten cent per pound federal excise tax on oleo-
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 US at 404 (McReynolds dissenting); Rock Royal 
Cooperative, 307 US at 582 (McReynolds and Butler dissenting); Currin v Wallace, 306 US 1, 19 
(1939) (McReynolds and Butler dissenting). 
 145 See generally R. Alton Lee, A History of Regulatory Taxation (Kentucky 1973).  
 146 For contemporary decisions rejecting Fourteenth Amendment objections to measures 
regulating such matters, see, for example, Booth v Illinois, 184 US 425, 429 (1902) (prohibiting 
options contracts in grain futures); Austin v Tennessee, 179 US 343, 348 (1900) (prohibiting “the 
sale of noxious or poisonous drugs”); Powell v Pennsylvania, 127 US 678, 687 (1888) (prohibiting 
manufacture of oleomargarine and imitation cheese). 
 147 See Barry Cushman, Painful Duties *97–105 (unpublished manuscript, 2008). 
 148 75 US 533 (1869). 
 149 Id at 548. 
 150 195 US 27 (1904). 
File: 17 - Cushman Final Created on: 10/28/2008 7:27:00 PM Last Printed: 12/2/2008 1:21:00 PM 
1942 The University of Chicago Law Review [75:1917 
margarine. White rejected the contention that “because a particular 
department of the government may exert its lawful powers with the 
object or motive of reaching an end not justified, therefore it becomes 
the duty of the judiciary to restrain the exercise of a lawful power 
wherever it seems to the judicial mind that such lawful power has 
been abused.”
151
 He recoiled from the proposition that the judiciary 
should intervene to prevent an exercise of a “lawful power . . . for an 
unlawful purpose.”
152
 To invalidate the tax would be to accept “the con-
tention that, under our constitutional system, the abuse by one de-
partment of the government of its lawful powers is to be corrected by 
the abuse of its powers by another department.”
153
 That proposition, 
White worried, “if sustained, would destroy all distinction between the 
powers of the respective departments of the government.”
154
 White 
quoted at length from judicial paeans to separation of powers
155
 and 
worried aloud about “judicial usurpation” overthrowing “the entire 
distinction between the legislative, judicial, and executive departments 
of the government, upon which our system is founded.”
156
 He recognized 
that the lack of judicial authority to invalidate the exercise of an enu-
merated power animated by “a wrongful motive or purpose” might re-
sult in “temporarily effectual” “abuses of a power conferred.”
157
 But he 
insisted that the remedy lay “not in the abuse by the judicial authority 
of its functions, but in the people, upon whom, after all, under our in-
stitutions, reliance must be placed for the correction of abuses com-
mitted in the exercise of a lawful power.”
158
 
The Court’s analysis on this point seemed to suggest that the 
congressional power to tax was subject to no federalism-based limita-
tions at all. A congressional purpose to usurp state regulatory preroga-
                                                                                                                           
 151 Id at 54.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id.  
 154 McCray, 195 US at 54–55. 
 155 See id at 55, quoting Justice Miller in Kilbourn v Thompson, 103 US 168, 190 (1881):  
It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional 
law, that all the powers intrusted to governments, whether State or National, are divided in-
to the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. That the func-
tions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be vested in a separate 
body of public servants, and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which 
separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined. It is also essen-
tial to the successful working of this system that the persons intrusted with power in any 
one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the 
others, but that each shall, by the law of its creation, be limited to the exercise of the powers 
appropriate to its own department, and no other. 
 156 McCray, 195 US at 54. 
 157 Id at 55. 
 158 Id. 
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tives through prohibitive regulatory taxation did not authorize judicial 
invalidation of the tax; nor was there a justiciable Tenth Amendment 
issue even though the effect of the tax was to eliminate an activity oth-
erwise subject to state authority. Yet Chief Justice White and his col-
leagues in the majority were unprepared to close the door completely 
on judicial supervision of regulatory taxation. “Let us concede,” White 
wrote in the opinion’s closing paragraph,  
That if a case was presented where the abuse of the taxing power 
was so extreme as to be beyond the principles which we have pre-
viously stated, and where it was plain to the judicial mind that the 
power had been called into play not for revenue but solely for the 
purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed 
consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which 
the Constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts to say 
that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a delegated 
power, but was the exercise of an authority not conferred.
159
 
Were a statute imposing a tax to destroy such fundamental rights, 
White was saying, the Court would be bound to say one of two things: 
either that the statute was “an abuse of a delegated power,” trans-
gressing express or implied limitations on enumerated powers, or that 
the statute constituted “the exercise of an authority not conferred”—
in other words, that it was not the exercise of the taxing power at all, 
even though on its face the statute imposed an excise. That principle 
was inapplicable in the present case, White pointed out, because the 
Court’s cases regarding police powers showed that “the manufacture 
of artificially colored oleomargarine may be prohibited by a free gov-
ernment without a violation of fundamental rights.”
160
 But in a case in 
which such a fundamental right would be destroyed, White seemed to 
say, the outcome would be different. 
The doctrinal structure that emerged from McCray thus entwined 
Fifth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers con-
cerns in a peculiar configuration. As a general rule, principles of separa-
tion of powers would preclude the Court from inquiring into whether a 
regulatory tax was intended to invade the regulatory space reserved to 
the states by the Tenth Amendment and was thus merely the pretextual 
exercise of an enumerated power “for the accomplishment of objects 
not entrusted to the government.”
161
 It was only in instances in which an 
act purporting to exercise the enumerated power to tax destroyed fun-
damental rights of the sort protected by the Fifth Amendment that the 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id at 64. 
 160 McCray, 195 US at 64. 
 161 McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 423 (1819). 
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Court would be prepared to denounce the statute as a pretextual exer-
cise of the power to tax.
162
 Only in cases that so imperiled a fundamental 
right would the Court overcome its separation of powers scruples and 
vindicate the Tenth Amendment interest in confining federal govern-
ment authority to that conferred by the Constitution. So long as con-
gressional regulatory taxation did not venture beyond the due process 
limits that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the exercise of 
the states’ police powers, there would be no occasion for the Court to 
subject such pretextual enactments to searching judicial scrutiny.  
In truth, then, it was for the time being that the Fifth Amendment, 
rather than the Tenth, imposed the constitutional limit on congres-
sional power to regulate through taxation. The sole means through 
which a Tenth Amendment interest might be judicially vindicated was 
through the assertion of a Fifth Amendment interest. We might call 
this Fifth Amendment federalism.  
As Congress became increasingly aggressive in imposing excise 
taxes for regulatory purposes, support on the Court dwindled to a nar-
row majority.
163
 In 1922, that majority collapsed. The Court invalidated 
the Child Labor Tax
164
 and the Future Trading Act
165
 by votes of 8-1 and 
9-0, respectively.
166
 There was no plausible contention that regulation of 
child labor or options contracts in grain futures transgressed limitations 
imposed by the Due Process Clause. The Court had unanimously sus-
tained an Illinois law regulating child labor
167
 and had upheld that state’s 
prohibition on options contracts in futures in 1902.
168
 These federal sta-
tutes, however, had imposed an excise on deviations from a prescribed 
and highly detailed course of conduct. The Court condemned these sta-
                                                                                                                           
 162 In his opinion Justice White stated that the Fifth Amendment “qualif[ied]” but did not 
“take away,” “withdraw[,] or expressly limit the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitu-
tion upon Congress,” and he seemed to prefer to treat the “fundamental rights” of which he 
wrote as “implied” rather than anchored to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. McCray, 
195 US at 61, 63. Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, like its counterpart in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, would continue to provide the textual basis for such fundamental 
rights as “liberty of contract,” see Adair, 208 US at 172; Wilson, 243 US at 357; Children’s Hospit-
al, 261 US at 545; the right to pursue a lawful calling on terms of equality with others, see Yu 
Cong Eng v Trinidad, 271 US 500, 525 (1926); and parental rights with respect to the education of 
their children, see Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284, 288–89 (1927).  
 163 See United States v Doremus, 249 US 86 (1919) (upholding provisions of the Harrison 
Narcotics Act by a vote of 5-4). 
 164 Child Labor Tax, Pub L No 65-254, 40 Stat 1138 (1919)  
 165 Future Trading Act, Pub L No 67-66, 42 Stat 187 (1921). 
 166 See Bailey v Drexel Furniture Co, 259 US 20, 37 (1922) (Child Labor Tax); Hill v Wallace, 
259 US 44, 66 (1922) (Future Trading Act). 
 167 See Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co v Beauchamp, 231 US 320, 325–26 (1913). 
 168 See Booth, 184 US at 429. Moreover, the Court would uphold in 1923 a federal statute 
regulating grain futures contract under the Commerce Clause in Chicago Board of Trade. See 
262 US at 33. 
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tutes as “penalties” rather than as true taxes. As Congress possessed no 
enumerated power to impose such penalties, the statutes violated the 
Tenth Amendment. These decisions signaled the emergence of Tenth 
Amendment federalism in the Court’s regulatory taxation jurisprudence. 
In 1933, the Roosevelt Administration sought to boost sagging 
agricultural prices by encouraging farmers to decrease output and 
thereby bring supply more into line with demand. There was good 
reason to believe that imposing a prohibitive excise on farmers plant-
ing an excess of acreage in specified commodities would run afoul of 
the precedents established by Bailey v Drexel Furniture Co
169
 and Hill 
v Wallace.
170
 What Congress did instead was to turn the excise tax up-
side down and frame it as a conditional expenditure. Those who signed 
acreage reduction contracts would receive a benefit payment; those 
who did not, would not.
171
 As the benefit payments were designed to 
provide the farmer with greater remuneration than he would receive 
were he to plant to capacity and sell at market prices, the noncoope-
rating farmer would be worse off than his cooperating competitor and 
thus effectively taxed for his noncompliance. In United States v Butler, 
the Court effectively assimilated the law of conditional expenditure to 
the law of regulatory taxation, invalidating the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
172
  
The acreage reduction contracts authorized by the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act were financed by an excise tax imposed upon com-
modities processors. The representative of the processor involved in 
the Butler litigation argued strenuously in his brief that taxing the 
processor in order to underwrite a benefit payment to a farmer took 
from the processor his property for a private rather than a public pur-
pose, and thereby denied him rights safeguarded by the Fifth 
Amendment.
173
 Justice Roberts did not directly address this contention 
in his opinion for the majority, but he did observe that “[a] tax, in the 
general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, 
signifies an exaction for the support of the Government. The word has 
never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from one 
group for the benefit of another.”
174
 The fact that the Act took the 
property of A and gave it to B, thereby implicating the sort of Fifth 
                                                                                                                           
 169 259 US 20 (1922). 
 170 259 US 44 (1922).  
 171 See Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat at 33 (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to 
issue a “nontransferable-option contract” to cotton producers that agreed to reduce production).  
 172 297 US at 70–73 (describing the coercive force of “the so-called tax imposed by the 
present act”). 
 173 Brief for Respondents, United States v Butler, No 95-401, *36–42 (filed Nov 30, 1935), 
available on Westlaw at 1935 WL 32712. 
 174 Butler, 297 US at 61. 
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Amendment interest to which Chief Justice White had alluded in 
McCray, gave rise to two conclusions. The first was that “the act is one 
regulating agricultural production” and “the tax is a mere incident of 
such regulation.” In other words, as “the act is not an exertion of the 
taxing power and the exaction not a true tax,” it could not claim the 
protection of McCray.
175
 The second was that “the respondents have 
standing to challenge the legality of the exaction.”
176
 Here again, the 
Tenth Amendment interest could be vindicated because of the pres-
ence of an implicated Fifth Amendment interest. 
Congress responded by removing the cognizable Fifth Amend-
ment interest. The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 
1936
177
 (SCDAA), enacted within two months of the Butler decision, 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to pay farmers to shift their 
acreage out of surplus commodities. Rather than financing these pay-
ments from a specified tax, as the Agricultural Adjustment Act had 
done, the new statute appropriated the necessary funds from general 
revenue.
178
 This was done to shelter the act under the taxpayer standing 
doctrine announced in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland in 1923. 
There a taxpayer had asserted that the effect of appropriations under 
the Sheppard-Towner Act
179
 would be “to increase the burden of future 
taxation and thereby take her property without due process of law.”
180
 
The Court had unanimously rebuffed her claim, maintaining that her  
interest in the moneys of the Treasury—partly realized from tax-
ation and partly from other sources—is shared with millions of 
others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the ef-
fect upon future taxation, of any payment of the funds, so remote, 
fluctuating, and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal 
to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
181
 
Because no one had a cognizable interest conferring standing to chal-
lenge the payments made from general revenue under the SCDAA, 
the claim of its congressional opponents that it was a regulatory ex-
penditure trespassing upon the domain reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment could not be vindicated in a judicial forum.
182
 
Butler and its legislative aftermath thus revealed that the law of regu-
                                                                                                                           
 175 Id. 
 176 Id.  
 177 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, Pub L No 74-461, 49 Stat 1148.  
 178 Id at 1149. 
 179 Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act, Pub L No 67-97, 42 Stat 224 (1921). 
 180 Frothingham v Mellon, 262 US 447, 486 (1923). 
 181 Id at 487. 
 182 See Cushman, 1998 J S Ct Hist at 92–93 (cited in note 79) (noting that opponents of the 
SCDAA in its “unchallengable form” were defeated by the bill’s proponents). 
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latory taxation and the law of conditional spending had become inte-
grated in a common regime of Fifth Amendment federalism. 
In order to appreciate how this last subsystem functioned and how 
it was understood by justices who applied it and reformers who sought 
to negotiate it, one needs to recognize the relationships among a variety 
of different doctrinal areas of the period’s constitutional law: regulatory 
taxation, conditional expenditure, the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth 
Amendment, and two species of justiciability doctrine. Our convention-
al constitutional law pedagogy, which is focused on the separate study of 
individual lines of doctrine, is poorly adapted to cultivating that sort of 
understanding. The kind of analysis advocated by Kennedy, which calls 
for investigation across doctrinal fields to identify and map systems and 
structures of legal thought, is by contrast well suited to the task. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought’s treatment of clas-
sical public law is more theory than history, more hypothesis than 
demonstration. It remained, and still remains, for other scholars to con-
duct the research necessary to assess its historical claims. Yet there can 
be little doubt that Duncan Kennedy, by calling attention to the prom-
ise of the structural analysis
183
 of classical constitutional doctrine, has 
helped to bring us closer to the elusive goal of total legal consciousness. 
So we’ve got that going for us. Which is nice.
184
 
                                                                                                                           
 183 For thoughtful reflections on various virtues and limitations of structural analysis, see 
Fisher, 49 Stan L Rev at 1073–76, 1089, 1093–95, 1099–1101 (cited in note 10); Ernst, 102 Yale L J at 
1029–32, 1035, 1037–40, 1044–45, 1074–75 (cited in note 10); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: 
The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 NYU L Rev 429, 471–95 (1987). 
 184 With apologies to Carl Spackler for excessive plagiarism of this phrase. See Caddyshack 
(Orion Pictures 1980), quotation available online at www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/quotes (vi-
sited Aug 29, 2008).  
